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tiorari to determine Thompson's right to
a jury trial or whether the charges should
have been returned for trial in the District
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the
District Court rule, relied on by the lower
court, which prevents a defendant from
praying a jury trial on petty offenses, no
longer applies when a case gets to the
Circuit Court.
Rule 741 of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure is applicable in Circuit Court,
where all defendants, without exception
as to petty offenses, are entitled to a trial
by jury. The Court further stated that if




by Peter H. Meyers
(Reprinted, with permission, from The Leaf-
let, A publication of the National Organiza-




How much help can police agents give in
the commission of a crime and still be
able to prosecute successfully after-
wards? That question recently split the
U.S. Supreme Court three ways in a
case that has narrowly defined the limits
of entrapment and other related de-
fenses.
The case, Hampton v. United States,
44 U.S.L.W. 4542 (April 27, 1976), in-
volved an undercover DEA agent who
had supplied Hampton with heroin and
then arranged for him to sell it to other
DEA agents. After Hampton made two
sales, he was arrested and convicted for
distributing heroin.
A five-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court, in affirming Hampton's convic-
tion, limits the defense of entrapment to
the rule it may do so, but until then the
Thompson case applies.
In Howard v. State, 32 Md. App. 75,
A2d 568 (1976), the defendant was
charged with disturbing the peace, as-
sault, and obstructing a police officer.
The defendant was to be tried in District
Court, which had concurrent jurisdiction
with the Circuit Court. However, the de-
fendant prayed a jury trial under the
provisions of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.
§4-302 (d)(2). The issue was whether
the demand for a juy trial on the latter
two offenses also deprived the District
Court of its original exclusive jurisdiction
t t
situations where government agents
"implant" the criminal design in the
mind of an innocent person. Entrapment
cannot be claimed when government
agents encourage or act in concert with
an individual who was "predisposed" to
commit an offense, as Hampton's attor-
ney had conceded he was.
However, entrapment is not the only
defense which can be raised when police
participate in the commission of a crime.
Two justices who voted to affirm
Hampton's conviction-Powell and
Blackmun-indicated in a separate opin-
ion that they would bar the prosecution
of a "predisposed" defendant when
"police overinvolvement in the crime
[reached] a demonstrable level of out-
rageousness," based upon due process
principles or the Court's supervisory
powers. The three dissenting justices-
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall-
agreed that outrageous police involve-
ment would bar prosecution, forming a
slender five-justice majority for this prin-
ciple. The dissenters would have gone
further, and reversed Hampton's convic-
tion in this case because of the police in-
volvement, stating that in their view:
"The Government's role has passed
the point of toleration ... The Govern-
ment is doing nothing less than buying
contraband from itself through an inter-
mediary and jailing the intermediary."
The other three justices who voted to
affirm Hampton's conviction-
Rehnquist, White, and Chief Justice
Burger-indicated in a separate opinion
over the petty offense, i.e., disturbing the
peace.
Under the Thompson ruling, the
Court of Special Appeals decided that
the trial court in Howard erred by sever-
ing the petty charges from the other two
charges for which a jury trial was prayed.
The court stated that the Circuit Court
properly acquired jurisdiction over all
the offenses with which the defendant
was charged and that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on all charges, in-
cluding the petty charges when joined
originally with charges falling under C.J.
§4-302.
that they did not recognize any defense
beyond entrapment, and would not bar
the prosecution of a "predisposed" de-
fendant no matter how outrageous the
government's involvement was in the
commission of a crime. Justice Stevens
did not participate.
This decision is binding only on the
federal courts, and not the states. A
number of state courts have adopted





The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
for the second time the defense of mem-
bers of a large communal group claiming
a right under the Free Exercise of Relig-
ion clause of the First Amendment to cul-
tivate marijuana for use in religious prac-
tices. In 1971, four members of the
group, including its spiritual leader,
Stephen Gaskin, were arrested and con-
victed for cultivating marijuana. All four
admitted growing marijuana, but argued
that marijuana was an integral part of the
religious practices at "the farm" a self-
sufficient spiritual community of about
800 individuals located in Summertown,
Tennessee.
After these convictions were affirmed
by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court summarily dismis-
sed an appeal "for want of a substantial
federal question" in 1973, Gaskin v.
Tennessee, 414 U.S. 886. The four indi-
viduals then entered the Tennessee
State Penitentiary and instituted post-
conviction proceedings, raising issues
similar to those raised in the original
appeal-primarily the free exercise of re-
ligion, but also cruel and unusual
punishment and other issues (but not the
right of privacy).
After their petition was denied by the
Tennessee Supreme Court, and after all
four had been released from prison, a
second appeal was filed with the U.S.
Supreme Court. On March 29, 1976,
the U.S. Supreme Court summarily
dismissed this second appeal, as it had
the first appeal, "for want of a substantial
federal question." Gaskin v. Tennessee,
44 U.S.L.W. 3545.
These summary dismissals, issued
without full briefing and oral argument
and without an opinion explaining the
Court's reasoning, are nontheless deci-
sions on the merits of the case, and are
binding on the lower courts.
However, because the Court did not
issue an opinion explaining its reason-
ing, the meaning and scope of the deci-
sion is unknowable-Is it limited to the
photo by June Chaplin
particular facts of this case, involving
manufacture of large amounts of
marijuana for use in religious practices at
"the farm"? Or did the Court intend to
foreclose any defense based upon the re-
ligious use of marijuana by any person
under any circumstance? This uncer-





The Supreme Court of California has
held that when a small amount of
marijuana is found in the passenger
compartment of a car, the police cannot
constitutionally search the trunk of the
car unless there are "specific articulable
facts" giving rise to a reasonable belief
that additional contraband may be con-
tained in the trunk.
Highway patrolmen had stopped a car
for reckless driving, and saw some
marijuana seeds and a pipe containing
residue in the car. They promptly
opened the trunk and found several
pounds of marijuana. The California
Supreme Court ordered that the
marijuana be suppressed, holding that
when the amount of marijuana and the
other facts of the case are "indicative
only of personal use," there is probable
cause to search only the interior of the
car. Probable cause to search the trunk,
the court said, requires "specific articul-
able facts" indicating that drug traffick-
ing may be involved or that additional
contraband may be contained in the
trunk. Wimberly v. Superior Court. 19
Cr.L.Rep 2006 (March 19. 1976).
The California Supreme Court's deci-
sion, based on the search and seizure
provisions of the state as well as federal
Constitution, is part of what Justice
Brennan has described as an "emerging
trend" among state supreme courts of
basing their decisions on state constitu-
tional provisions. United States v. Miller,
44 U.S.L.W. at 4533 (April 21, 1976).
Justice Brennan, the senior justice of the
U.S. Supreme Court, has in a number of
recent dissenting opinions actively en-
couraged state judges to base their deci-
sions on state constitutional grounds,
because these decisions would not be
21
reviewable by the U.S. Supreme Court
and the state courts could provide
greater protection for individual rights
and liberties under state constitutions
than the "Burger Court" is providing
under the Federal Constitution. See,
Baxter v. Palmigiano, 44 U.S.L.W. at
4497 (April 20, 1976); Miller, supra, 44
U.S.L.W. at 4533-34 and fn. 4. See
generally, "Analysis" at 18 Cr.L.Rep.
2507-08.
UPDATE ON RIGHT OF
PRIVACY CASES
Alaska-Last year the Supreme Court
of Alaska ruled unanimously in Ravin v.
State, 537 P.2d 494 (1975), that the
constitutional right of privacy protects
the possession of marijuana for personal
use in the home. Relying on the Ravin
decision, the Superior Court for the
Third Judicial District of Alaska has or-
dered the state police to return an
8-ounce bag of marijuana seized from a
defendant's apartment. State police had
entered the apartment with a search
warrant for stolen goods, and seeing the
8-ounce bag of marijuana, seized it. The
Superior Court, concluding that the
marijuana was "possessed by defendant
for personal use," ordered that it be re-
turned to him. State v. McGahan, Cr.
Case No. 76-15045, order issued April
22, 1976. Before the marijuana was re-
turned, DEA agents obtained a federal
search warrant and took the marijuana
from the state police lockers. Legal ac-
tion has been instituted in federal court
to compel the DEA to return the
marijuana.
In another case, the Supreme Court of
Aslaska has refused to extend Ravin to
protect a defendant who possessed over
two pounds of marijuana and delivered
it to an undercover agent in a public
parking lot. Belgarde v. State, File No.
2447, Op. No. 1206 (Nov. 28,
19 75 )'Florida-The Circuit Court for
Dade County, Florida, has "reluctantly"
rejected a constitutional challenge to the
state's marijuana possession law, stating
that it was obligated to follow a 1969
Florida Supreme Court decision which
had upheld the law. The Circuit Court's
opinion urged the Florida Supreme
Court to reconsider its 1969 decision on
the basis of current knowledge about
marijuana, and also "strongly recom-
mended" that the Florida legislature de-
criminalize private possession and use.
Lawrence Berrin, NORML's Florida
State Coordinator, argued the case.
NORML is assisting in the preparation of
an appeal. State v. Gilbert, Case No.
75-8916 (April 30, 1976).
Tennessee--A lawsuit focusing on the
right of privacy was filed by NORML and
others in the U.S. District Court for
Western Tennessee. Bruce S. Kramer of
Memphis, an ACLU attorney, is han-
dling the suit. Tenn. Affiliate of NORML
v. Levi, No. C-76-187, filed May 3,
1976.
District of Columbia-The federal
three-judge court which is hearing
NORML's privacy suit in the District of
Columbia has ordered that the local
D.C. defendants, but not the federal de-
fendants, be dismissed from the suit for
lack of jurisdiction. NORML v. Cul-
linane, Civ. Act. No. 1897-73, issued
May 5, 1976.
Arizona-The Superior Court for
Yavapai County, Arizona, has rejected a
constitutional challenge to the state's
marijuana possession law. Charles A.
Shaw of Prescott is bringing the chal-
lenge, along with Woody Higgins,
NORML's Arizona State Coordinator.
An appeal has been filed. State v. Mur-
phy, Crim. Act. No. 7893, April 30,
1976.
IN BRIEFDEA
e The U.S. District Court for Eastern
Michigan has held that airport search
techniques which may constitutionally
be used to prevent airplane hijackings
cannot constitutionally be used by the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) to prevent drug smuggling. As
serious as the county's drug problem is,
the court said, it does not threaten the
fabric of society to the degree that air pi-
racy does. The Court held that the DEA
cannot make airport drug searches
based solely on a person's "suspicious"
activities in the airport and the fact that
he fits the "drug courier" profile which
the DEA has prepared. Independent
evidence of drug activity, or consent to
the search, is required. United States v.
Van Lewis, 18 Cr.L.Rep. 2549 (1976).
* The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has upheld a $500
contempt-of-court fine against former
DEA Administrator John R. Bartels and
agent Michael Bannon. The contempt
fine had been imposed by the U.S. Dis-
trict Court after the DEA refused to obey
a court order to return to a drug store its
stock of controlled substances which the
DEA had seized. In upholding the fine,
the Fifth Circuit stated: "We are thus
confronted with the odd spectacle of
persons charged with the enforcement
of the law refusing, themselves, to obey
a specific court order." Norman Bridge
Drug Co. v. Bannon, 19 Cr.L.Rep. 2066
(1976).
* The New York Court of Appeals has
declared invalid a consent form signed
by a cocaine dealer authorizing DEA
agents to search his apartment because
"the apparent consent was induced by
overbearing official conduct and was not
a free exercise of will." The Court
criticized the coercive atmosphere sur-
rounding the consent, and the failure of
the DEA agents to get a search warrant
even after the individual had been ar-
rested and handcuffed in his apartment,
with 9 federal agents present. People v.
Gonzales, 19 Cr.L. Rep 2081 (1976).
* The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that the failure of a
trial judge to give a cautionary instruc-
tion to the jury to carefully scrutinize a
well-paid DEA informer's uncorrobo-
rated testimony against the defendant,
was plain error requiring reversal of the
conviction even though defendant's
counsel had not requested this instruc-
tion. United States v. Garcia, 18
Cr.L.Rep. 2565 (1976).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
* The U.S. District Court for Northern
Illinois has held that a junior high school
22
principal and other school officials who
subjected a student to a fruitless strip-
search for drugs are not immune from
liability in a civil suit brought by the stu-
dent under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Picha
v. Wielgos, 18 Cr.L.Rep. 2537 (1976).
e The D.C. Superior Court has held that
a search warrant for marijuana plants on
an apartment patio did not justify a sub-
sequent search inside of the apartment.
The Court suppressed additional
marijuana and LSD which were found in
the apartment. United States v. O'Leary,
18 Cr.L.Rep. 2344 (1975).
* The New Mexico Court of Appeals
has held that police officers manning a
general roadblock, doing routine
license and registration checks, ex-
ceeded their authority in searching the
trunk of a car for contraband. The court
reversed the defendant's conviction and
ordered the marijuana found in the trunk
to be suppressed. State v. Bloom, 19
Cr.L.Rep. 2060 (1976).
* The Maryland Court of Special Appe-
als has held that the removal of hash oil-
filled balloons from a semi-conscious
hospital patient's excrement was not a
"search" covered by the Fourth
Amendment. The contents of the pa-
tient's bedpan, the court said, was
"abandoned property." Venner v.
State, 19 Cr.L.Rep 2105 (1976).
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
* The Florida Supreme Court has held
that when a drunk driver is involved in
an automobile accident, the jury can
award punitive damages in a negligence
suit based solely upon the act of driving
while intoxicated, without any proof of
carelessness or abnormal driving. In-
gram v. Pettit, 44 L.W. 2478 (1976).
* The Minnesota Supreme Court has
held that a defendant convicted of a hit-
and-run automobile accident was enti-
fled to make a defense of "involuntary
intoxication" based upon his ingestion
of valium pursuant to a doctor's prescrip-
tion. The Court indicated that defendant
must prove that he did not know, or
have reason to know, that the prescribed
drug was likely to have an intoxicating ef-
fect, and that the result of the intoxica-
tion was temporary insanity. State v. Al-
timus, 18 Cr.L.Rep. 2416 (1976).
MILITARY
e The U.S. Court of Military Appeals
has held that a soldier who laid the
groundwork for a heroin importation
scheme while stationed in Saigon, but
who did not make the first "overt act" to
complete the conspiracy until after he re-
turned to the United States, was im-
properly court-martialed because the
conspiracy was not "service-con-
nected." United States v. Black, 19
Cr.L.Rep. 2030 (1976).
e The U.S. Court of Military Appeals
has held that evidence which is obtained
by police in a foreign country in accor-
dance with that country's law is admissi-
ble in a U.S. court-martial. The court's
decision added that foreign searches
must satisfy Fourth Amendment stan-
dards whenever American officials are
present at the scene of the search or
"provide any information or assistance,
directive or request, which sets in mo-
tion, aids, or otherwise furthers the ob-
jectives" of the search. United States v.
Jordon, 19 Cr.L.Rep. 2025 (1976).
OTHER CASES
* In England, where marijuana is de-
fined by law as "the flowering or fruiting
tops of any plant of the genus cannabis,"
two persons charged with possession of
small amounts of marijuana have been
acquitted following arguments by their
attorneys that the law did not prohibit
possession of cannabis leaves, and that
the prosecution had failed to prove that
the marijuana involved was from the
flowering tops, rather than the leaves of
the plant. R. v. Duffle, Mold Crown
Court, Wales (Jan. 29, 1976); R. v.
Berriedale-Johnson, Kingston Crown
Court, Thames (Feb. 3, 1976). This
"flowering tops defense" cannot be
raised in the United States because the
definitions of marijuana, or cannabis,
contained in all state laws and in the
Federal Controlled Substances Act in-
clude cannabis leaves.
e The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
has struck down a condition of probation
imposed by the trial judge upon a
marijuana defendant, requiring him to
submit "his person, place of residence
and vehicle to search and seizure at any
time of the day or night, with or without a
search warrant, whenever requested to
do so by the Probation Officer or any law
enforcement officer." The court indi-
cated that while trial judges have wide
discretion in setting the terms of proba-
tion, a probationer cannot be forced to
surrender his entire Fourth Amendment
rights. This condition of probation went
far beyond the legitimate needs of the
probationary process. Tamez v. State,
19 Cr.L.Rep. 2026 (1976).
a The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has held that a resident alien
whose state marijuana conviction has
been expunged by the state court is still
subject to automatic deportation from
the United States. Kolios v. Imm. & Nat.
Serv., 19 Cr.L.Rep 2111 (1976).
* The Illinois Supreme Court has up-
held the constitutionality of a classifica-
tion scheme for marijuana and other
drugs which is based upon the total
weight of the substance with which the
drugs may be mixed, rather than the
weight of the illegal drugs themselves.
People v. Mayberry, 19 Cr.L.Rep 2018
(1976).
* The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant
cannot be convicted of a criminal at-
tempt under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 for sel-
ling a substance he believed to be heroin
to an undercover agent, when the sub-
stance was in reality an uncontrolled
substance. United States v. Oviedo, 18
Cr.L.Rep 2411 (1976).
e The Michigan Supreme Court has re-
jected the "usable amount" test for pos-
session of heroin, holding that: "where
there is an amount of narcotic visible to
the naked eye, regardless of how much it
is, there is a sufficient amount to permit
prosecution. We leave open the ques-
tion of whether it is possible to sustain a
conviction if the amount involved is not
visible." People v. Harrington, 18
Cr.L.Rep. 2437 (1976).
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